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I.  Introduction 
On Friday, December 18th 2015, President Barack Obama signed a bill 
into law changing all of our lives.  In a late-night session, Congress slipped 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”) into the 
omnibus-spending package, which was pending the President’s signature.  
This bill was very similar to a number of other cybersecurity bills Congress 
previously tried and failed to pass.  They failed in large part due to 
protestation by civil liberty groups and citizens across the country claiming 
that the proposed legislation lacked fundamental protection for individual 
privacy rights.  CISA, the bill that lived, was passed in order to create a law 
that would regulate information sharing concerning cyber crime among 
government and private entities, as well as between private entities.  
However, the legislation’s broad language has created what some have called 
the Second Patriot Act. 
Supporters of the bill argue that the bill’s promotion of information 
sharing would contribute to the larger effort to fix the private sector’s 
cybersecurity underinvestment1 and provide companies with antitrust2 and 
tort litigation protection.3  Additionally, the bill would protect intellectual 
property rights by promoting information sharing relating to cyberattacks 
and help alleviate future attacks based on this information.4 
CISA was hastily passed, arguably due to a spate of recent cyber attacks 
on large corporations.  In 2013, “more than 600 breaches [ha[d] been] reported 
nationwide.”5  These included high-profile breaches that heavily affected the 
public.  One of these breaches involved the theft of approximately 40 million 
 
 1.  Proponents of CISA have argued that the availability of abundant information about 
“cyberincidents and cyberthreats” will allow more reliable data and help corporations (and the 
government) more accurately “calculate efficient levels of cybersecurity.”  Melanie J. Teplinsky, 
Fiddling on The Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 225, 279 (2013). 
 2.  Antitrust laws may also affect a company’s decision to share information. Andrew Nolan, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: LEGAL 
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 26–49 (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf. 
 3.  A company could be found negligent for failing to act upon a threat, if an individual can 
show actual damages for the claim.  The fear of ligation may cause companies to not divulge 
information regarding a cyberattack.  Id. at 29–31. 
 4.  Companies fear that information shared with the government could prompt an 
investigation by government regulators or that this sensitive information will be used as evidence 
in a regulatory action against the company.  Id. at 37–38; Gerald O’Hara, Cyber-Espionage: A 
Growing Threat to the American Economy, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 241, 271 (2010). 
 5.  Howard M. Privette, et al., The SEC Guidance on Cybersecurity Measures For Public 
Companies, 37 L.A. LAW 14, 15 (2014). 
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credit and debit card account numbers from the Target Corporation.6  Another, 
allegedly carried out by the Chinese government, involved a large-scale hack on 
the Office of Personnel Management. 
However, opponents of the bill argue that it violates civil liberties and 
citizens’ basic privacy rights.  Representative Justin Amash (R-Mich.), with 
the support of other members of Congress, has written extensively on the 
negative impacts of the bill.7  He has stated that its broad language would 
lead to over-sharing of a company’s users’ private information by allowing 
companies to share a wide range of information with multiple government 
agencies, including the National Security Agency (“NSA”)8 with complete 
immunity.9  Additionally, leading technologists say that the type of 
information sharing promoted in CISA gets nothing accomplished by way of 
security.10  Even technology companies have come out against the bill, 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Press Release, Jordan Bush, Amash Introduces Measure to Repeal Anti-Privacy Cyber 
Bill, (Jan. 13, 2016), http://amash.house.gov/press-release/amash-introduces-measure-repeal-anti-
privacy-cyber-bill. Amash was joined by Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-
Calif.), Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), Rep. Ted Poe (R-Tex.), and Rep. Jared Polis (D-Colo.). 
 8.  The bill establishes that companies will primarily be sharing information with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), however it “requires DHS to establish processes to share 
the information it receives with other federal agencies,” including intelligence agencies like the 
NSA.  Justin Amash, Oversight and Government Reform Committee, 114th Cong., Oppose 
Omnibus to Stop Anti-Privacy Cyber Bill (Comm. Print 2015) [hereinafter Oppose Omnibus] 
http://amash.house.gov/sites/amash.house.gov/files/2015%201217%20OmniCISA%20DC.pdf. 
 9.  This bill includes no exemption to the liability waiver for gross negligence or willful 
misconduct, meaning companies may “overshare their user’s personal, private information with 
complete immunity.”  Id.; see also, Press Release, Jordan Bush, AMASH INTRODUCES MEASURE 
TO REPEAL ANTI-PRIVACY CYBER BILL (Jan. 13, 2016), http://amash.house.gov/press-release/ 
amash-introduces-measure-repeal-anti-privacy-cyber-bill. 
 10. See Jennifer Granick, Technologists Oppose CISA/Information Sharing Bills, STANFORD 
CYBERLAW BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/04/technologists-oppose-
cisainformation-sharing-bills. “Private information about individual users is often a detriment in 
developing threat signatures because we need to be able to identify an attack no matter where it 
comes from and no matter who the target is.  Any bill that allows for and results in significant 
sharing of personal information could decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and make [indicators of 
compromise] less actionable.”  Thus, when companies need to share address information, they are 
typically sharing the addresses of servers which are used to host malware, or to which a 
compromised computer will connect for the exfiltration of data.  Id.  “This addressing information 
helps potential victims block malicious incoming connections.  These addresses do not belong to 
subscribers or customers of the victims of a security breach or of the companies whose systems we 
are helping to secure.  Sharing this kind of addressing is a common current practice.” Id.  (Quoting 
a letter written by technologists, academics, and computer and network security professionals who 
research, report on, and defend against Internet security threats).  See also Jonathan Keane, 5 Things 
You Need to Know About the CISA Bill That Just Passed, PASTE (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/12/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-cisa-bill-
that.html (there is no way to prove that sharing this data could prevent a cyber-attack, moreover, 
the government’s collection of this data could create more harm than good, by creating a 
“centralized database of user info[rmation] that hackers could target”). 
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stating that more effective legislation is necessary to deal with cyber threats 
while maintaining individual privacy.11 
This paper argues that as the bill stands, its lack of protections for 
individual security and privacy outweigh its effectiveness in preventing 
cyber economic espionage.  It proceeds in three parts.  Part Two will address 
the differences between traditional espionage and cyber economic espionage 
and why cyber economic espionage is a novel and significant problem.  Part 
Three will provide the current legal framework to confront the problems 
cyber-economic espionage has created and will ultimately argue that these 
solutions have created their own problems.  Finally, Part Four will examine 
other options the U.S. has as an alternative to combat cyber economic 
espionage. 
II.  Discernible Differences Between Traditional Espionage and 
Cyber Economic Espionage Demonstrate a New Problem 
Emerging and the Need for a Regulatory Framework 
Espionage is the “world’s second oldest profession.”12  It is a practice 
that states have continuously engaged in and “acknowledged as a matter of 
practical reality,” even during peacetime.13  Espionage is defined as “the 
activity of using spies to collect information about what another government 
or company is doing or plans to do.”14  Countries all over the world have 
continually conducted espionage operations in other nation states in order to 
“know more about the internal military, political, economic, and social 
developments in those countries, information that would otherwise be 
impossible to know from open sources.”15 
 
 11.  See Jonathan Keane, 5 Things You Need to Know About the CISA Bill That Just Passed, 
PASTE (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/12/5-things-you-need-to-
know-about-the-cisa-bill-that.html.  (“Reddit, Yelp, Twitter, and unsurprisingly Apple have all 
voiced opposition to these measures”); see also Amul Kalia, Tech Industry Trade Groups are 
Coming out Against CISA. We Need Individual Companies to do the Same, EFF (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/tech-industry-trade-groups-are-coming-out-against-cisa-we- 
need-individual. 
 12.  Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and 
Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1163 (2011); see also Casey M. Bruner, Authorized 
Investigation: A Temperate Alternative to Cyber Insecurity, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1463, 1477 
(2015) (“[e]spionage between governments is nearly as old as government itself”). 
 13.  WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1163. 
 14.  Espionage, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15.  Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under 
International Law, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 444, 466 (2015). 
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A.  Traditional Political or Military Espionage  
Political military espionage (henceforth “conventional espionage”), or 
intelligence collection through surreptitious, intrusive means inside a foreign 
nation’s territory without that nation’s knowledge or consent for the purpose 
of national security, has not been considered a violation of international 
norms as long as it does not violate the nation’s sovereignty.16  Every nation 
has “some type of intelligence service” that is responsible for espionage 
activities worldwide.17 
The current state of international law reflects the general 
acknowledgment among most countries that espionage is an acceptable 
practice conducted by most states during peaceful times.18  United Nations 
Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, protects states from violation of their territory as well as 
protecting their political independence, but refers only to acts that involve 
the threat or use of force; under the U.N. Charter espionage does not reach 
the level of use of force.19 
Another indication that espionage does not violate or implicate 
international law is that it is the practice used by most countries to apprehend 
spies.  The offended state does not condemn the offending nation of the spy, 
rather the individual is held in violation of domestic law in the state where he 
or she is apprehended.20  Therefore, because international law does not clearly 
condone nor explicitly prohibit the conduct, it tends to support the conclusion 
 
 16.  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) 
(sovereignty “implies a state’s lawful control over its territory generally to the exclusion of other 
states, authority to govern in that territory, and authority to apply law there.); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 206 (1987) (The sovereignty of a state is reflected also in 
immunity for the state and its public property from certain exercises of authority by other states”). 
 17.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 459. 
 18.  See id. at 475, “as the Cold War evolved, espionage became a systematic, publicly 
recognized form of state activity essential to the conduct of international relations, with almost all 
countries actively engaging in the practice.” 
 19. See also, David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 347, 371 (2013). 
 20.  See LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 461–479, “when a spy is caught abroad, there is no 
sense of legal culpability for the state from which the spy was sent, instead, culpability extends 
only to the individual . . . it is rare for the expelling state to claim that these activities themselves 
violate international law”; see also, WEISSBRODT, supra note 19, at 371, “espionage is used by 
nations at the risk that if their spies are apprehended in a foreign jurisdiction they may be prosecuted 
criminally.”  But cf., John Radson, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 
28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 620 (2007), extradition treaties provide proof that a crime has reached a 
level of international consensus, in regards to espionage there is proof that it is treated more like a 
political offense, “that would suggest international disagreement or a contradiction between 
domestic norms and international norms.” 
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that espionage is nothing more than the violation of another nation’s laws.21  
Thus, espionage is seemingly a consensus among states.22 
B.  Traditional Economic Espionage  
Espionage is primarily a method in which countries obtain information 
clandestinely in order to protect their nation’s national security interests.23  
The information sought can come from a “foreign government, enemy or 
ally, as well as . . . foreign corporations.”24  U.S. Policy explicitly authorizes 
and regulates secret covert action pertaining to political, military, and 
economic conditions in other countries.25  Therefore, there is not much of a 
difference in the way the U.S. treats traditional conventional espionage 
versus traditional economic espionage, when carried out for the protection 
or in the interest of national security.26  Like conventional espionage, 
economic espionage is not a new phenomenon.27 
Furthermore, like conventional espionage, the U.S. does prosecute 
those who conduct economic espionage.  Similar to conventional espionage, 
those individuals who are caught are held in violation of domestic law.28  
Additionally, in 1996, the U.S. adopted the Economic Espionage Act 
(“EEA”), which made the theft of trade secrets from U.S. companies a 
Federal crime.29  The EEA was the “first federal statute to criminalize the 
theft of trade secrets.”30  The EEA criminalized domestic economic 
espionage and economic espionage that intended to benefit foreign powers.31  
 
 21.  WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1174–75; see also Christina Parajon Skinner, An 
International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1180 (2014). 
 22.  Rather than an international norm. 
 23.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 466. 
 24.  Id.; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1177, “a number of (often classified) 
multilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements such as the relationship among the signals 
intelligence agencies of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
— the ‘five eyes’ — may help to establish or evidence customary norms for what constitute 
acceptable forms of espionage.”  
 25.  WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1169. 
 26.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 449. 
 27.  See BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1477. 
 28.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 461–79. 
 29.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 470; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831–183 (West 2013). 
 30.  Jonathan Eric Lewis, The Economic Espionage Act and the Threat of Chinese Espionage 
in the United States, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 189, 200 (2009). 
 31.  Id.; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2013) provides in part that: 
 a)  In general — Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly — 
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The EEA was passed to “prevent corporate insiders from stealing trade 
secrets and selling them to foreign governments and foreign or domestic 
companies.”32 
C.  Cyber Economic Espionage 
It is important to distinguish conventional or traditional espionage from 
cyber economic espionage.33  The goal of cyber economic espionage, for the 
purpose of this paper, is to strengthen private corporate interests for the benefit 
of the offending nation while preventing the target from advancing 
economically.34  Unlike traditional espionage, cyber economic espionage is not 
used to help make policy decisions for political or military security.35  
Furthermore, the current trend of foreign governments condoning or conducting 
economic espionage to assist their countries’ businesses to gain a global 
economic advantage is a relatively new phenomenon in the global economy.36 
In contrast, traditional espionage provides for reciprocal “acceptance 
and benefits between states,”37 while cyber economic espionage only stands 
to benefit the state engaging in the practice.38  With cyber economic 
espionage, there is no “custom of reciprocity or cooperation that states 
should be concerned about preserving.”39  Furthermore, traditional espionage 
“allows states to determine and verify other states’ intentions,”40 as well as 
learn about another state’s military capabilities.  This knowledge allows 
 
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, 
or byfraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; 
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, 
sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; 
  (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen 
or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; 
  (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or 
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in 
any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be 
fined not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. 
 32.  LEWIS, supra note 30; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2013). 
 33.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1183, “It would be a mistake to afford the same legal 
treatment to economic cyber espionage.” 
 34.  Id. at 1177. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1477. 
 37.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 488, “traditional espionage can serve to increase the 
security of states, helping to decrease the chances of surprise attacks and minimizing conflict, 
thereby preserving global security.” 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id.; SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1183. 
 40.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 489. 
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states to prevent a threat, which might decrease the likelihood of a successful 
surprise attack.41  Thus, in effect, traditional espionage functions as an 
operational restraint for conflict that helps preserve global stability.42 
The U.S. has been unwilling to accept cyber economic espionage as an 
international norm.43  Attacks on American companies have increased by 
seventy-five percent between 2011 and 2012.44  According to Assistant 
Attorney General John Carlin, there has been an estimated loss in the U.S. 
of more than $300 billion from the theft of intellectual property.45  
Consequently, cyber economic espionage has been dubbed “the biggest 
intelligence disaster since the loss of nuclear secrets [in the late 1940s].”46 
Furthermore, U.S. officials have maintained that intelligence agencies 
do not collect trade secrets of foreign companies nor provide those secrets to 
U.S. companies for business advantages.47  According to scholars, “U.S. 
officials have taken great pains to reiterate the distinction between spying on 
foreign officials and conducting economic intelligence.”48  The former is 
important to protect U.S. national security while the latter is forbidden.49 
It should be understood that this is how the U.S. defines cyber economic 
espionage.  Some critics, like Jack Goldsmith, believe that the U.S. couches 
these statements broadly and that the collection of information is in fact, very 
“robust,” implying the government may not only collect information purely 
for national security interests.50  Additionally, Goldsmith notes that China has a 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 451–52. 
 44.  Id. at 453. 
 45.  John Carlin, Remarks at the Brookings Institute’s Emerging National Security Threats 
Forum, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/nsd/pr/assistant-
attorney-general-john-carlin-delivers-remarks-brookings-institutes-emerging. Assistant Attorney 
General John Carlin contends that there is a difference between nations carrying out traditional 
espionage versus cyber economic espionage.  He purports that “responsible nations do conduct 
intelligence activities” but goes on to say that these intelligence activities are “focused on the 
national security needs of our country.”  Indeed, since the emergence of the practice of cyber 
economic espionage, the U.S. has drawn a line between foreign intelligence gathering for national 
security purposes and spying on foreign corporations to gain a “competitive economic advantage 
in the international market place.” 
 46.  TEPLINSKY, supra, note 1 at 258. 
 47.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 452–63. 
 48.  Id. at 465. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on U.S. Economic Espionage, Post-Snowden, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-us-economic-espionage-post-snowden. 
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very different economic system and relationship with private businesses than the 
U.S.; this, combined with the fact that China is in a different stage of 
development than the U.S., leads him to believe that it is natural that China has 
adopted an “IP [intellectual property]-stealing” espionage strategy versus the 
U.S.’s “IP-preserving” espionage strategies, and that the U.S.’s treatment of 
China amounts to little more than a “complaint” that the Chinese are pursuing 
their own interests at the expense of the U.S.51 
Despite justification for why cyber economic espionage exists, as 
provided by Mr. Goldsmith, the act itself should not be tolerated because it 
does not allow for the exchange of benefits that facilitate global stability and 
security.52  For one, the spying state is harming the target state’s “incentive 
to innovate, natural comparative advantages and robustness as trading 
partners.”53  Additionally, economic espionage fuels instability by providing 
the ability to cripple another nation’s economy and possibly contribute to the 
destabilization of the global economy, thereby creating the ability to 
potentially risk the peace and security of the international community.54  
Thus, the need for a regulatory framework to curb the use of cyber economic 
espionage by foreign governments is paramount. 
However, the EEA does not help protect the U.S. from the current form 
of cyber economic espionage being carried out by foreign nations.55  Congress 
was unable to anticipate the use of the Internet to engage in the theft of 
intellectual property from domestic companies by foreign governments within 
their own boarders.56  That is because the volume of information stolen via 
cyberspace is much more significant and happens at a quicker pace than 
traditional human or technical intelligence gathering.57  Moreover, the 
infiltration of computer systems is far more difficult to detect and stop.58 
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1183–84. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.; see BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1478 (“[T]he economic losses due to cyber insecurity 
are significant.”); O’HARA, supra note 4, at 242 (finding that the “the American economy is at risk 
“in a way that many policymakers could not have envisioned just a decade ago.”); TEPLINSKY, 
supra note 1, at 258–59 (quoting Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar in three U.S. 
presidential administrations, as saying, “every major company in the United States has already been 
penetrated by China, we are currently in a position to lose our competitiveness by having  ‘all of 
our research and development stolen by the Chinese,’ while companies  in the U.S. spends huge 
sums of money on research and development and that information goes free to China . . . after a 
while you can’t compete”). 
 55.  O’HARA, supra note 4, at 243–44. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1183–84. 
 58.  Id. 
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In 2013, the Mandiant report59 shed new light on the significance of Chinese 
cyber economic espionage operations.60  The report ignited concern from both the 
public and private sector and led to an increased initiative to stem the U.S.’s 
vulnerability to cyber attacks.61  Subsequently, President Barack Obama signed 
Executive Order 13636 (“Order”), which called for the development of a cyber 
security framework that would facilitate the improvement of critical 
infrastructure.62  The Order also called for information sharing between the public 
and private sectors.63  However, the Order emphasized that the framework was 
voluntary and that businesses and organizations were encouraged to manage their 
cyber security risks effectively.64 
The U.S.’s position on “economic espionage has always been that there 
should be a separation between the government and the private sector, and 
government resources should not be used to benefit specific companies.”65  
Consequently, no federal agency is responsible for defending private 
businesses, and the federal government has avoided mandates regarding 
private sector cyber security practices.66  However, a former member of the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations has recently been quoted as 
stating that companies can “‘no longer fight the bad guys individually,’”67 
 
 59.  The Mandiant report was publicly released by Mandiant, a cybersecurity consulting firm.  
The report was based on a seven-year long investigation that linked China to “a major cyber 
espionage campaign targeting several United States’ business and industries.”  Kayla Morency, 
Cybersecurity Finally Takes Center Stage in the U.S., 15 J. OF HIGH TECH. & L. 192, 195–96 
(2014); MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013), 
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2016). 
 60.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 264; MORENCY, supra note 59, at 196. 
 61.  MORENCY, supra note 59, at 210–11 (“[A]fter the news spread of this tangible proof, 
many reporters, politicians, and business institutions referred to the report as a ‘wakeup’ call, 
highlighting the immediate need for cybersecurity legislation or a comprehensive approach to 
minimize these threats.”). 
 62.  Id. at 218–19. 
 63.  Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013) (“[I]t is the policy of the 
United States Government to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat 
information shared with U.S. private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and 
defend themselves against cyber threats.”). 
 64.  Id.; MORENCY, supra note 59, at 218–19. 
 65.  LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 472; see also TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 232 (stating that 
the U.S. has adopted a “largely self-regulatory, market-based approach to cybersecurity, relying on 
the private sector to secure its own networks.”). 
 66.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 232. 
 67.  Jennifer Steinhauer, House Passes Cybersecurity Bill After Companies Fall Victim to Data 
Breaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/us/politics/computer-attacks-
spur-congress-to-act-on-cybersecurity-bill-years-in-making.html. 
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and the security of these networks has become essential to U.S. economic 
and national security interests because of the emerging threat of nation-state 
sponsored cyber economic espionage.68 
The significance of cyber economic espionage (i.e., the damage, lack of 
attribution) and the difficulties of using conventional methods (i.e., EEA) to 
respond to threats, have motivated a change of strategy from ex post 
mechanisms of deterrence (i.e., criminal justice system) to ex ante 
preventative measures.  This in turn, bolstered previously unsuccessful 
efforts to pass an information-sharing bill.69  At the end of 2015, Congress 
suddenly and underhandedly passed CISA, a suspicious bill that 
commentators have called the Second Patriot Act.70  The next section will 
explore the privacy implications of CISA. 
III.  The Privacy Failures of the  
Cyber Information Sharing Act 
Fast-forward to December 2015, Congress finally passed the Cyber 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (“CISA”) by slipping it into the 2016 
omnibus-spending package.71  Different versions of the cyber information-
sharing bill were passed in the House and Senate, but Congress did not have 
a chance to resolve the differences between the two bills before it was “snuck 
 
 68.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 233. 
 69.  Prior to the Mandiant report and Executive Order 13636, Congress had tried to pass a 
number of bills that promoted information sharing among the government, businesses, and 
organizations.  One such bill, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (“CISPA”), failed 
to pass when it was first introduced in 2012 and when it was subsequently reintroduced in 2013. 
HR 3523, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 192 (Apr. 26, 2012), http://clerk.house. 
gov/evs/2012/roll192.xml; Gerry Smith, Senate Won’t Vote on CISPA, Deals Blow to Controversial 
Cyber Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/cispa-
cyber-bill_n_3158221.html. 
 70.  Andy Greenberg, Congress Slips CISA Into a Budget Bill That’s Sure to Pass, WIRED 
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/congress-slips-cisa-into-omnibus-bill-thats-
sure-to-pass/ (According to Robyn Greene from the Open Technology institute, “‘they’re kind of 
pulling a Patriot Act . . . they’ve got this bill that’s kicked around for years and had been too 
controversial to pass, so they’ve seen an opportunity to push it through without debate.  And they’re 
taking that opportunity.’”). 
 71.  Russel Brandon, Congress Passes Controversial Cybersecurity Bill Attached to Omnibus 
Budget, THE VERGE (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/18/10582446/ congress-
passes-cisa-surveillance-cybersecurity; Obama Signs $1.1 Trillion Spending Package, Approves CISA 
Surveillance Legislation, RT (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.rt.com/usa/326481-obama-signs-budget-cisa-
bill/ [hereinafter Spending Package]; Aaron Boyd, Final CISA Bill Wrapped Into Omnibus Package, 
FED. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/ 
2015/12/16/cisa-omnibus/77416226/; Kristin Shields, Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and 
Protecting Against Attacks, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 345, 358 (2015) (“[O]ver the last five years, 
almost 100 bills regarding cybersecurity have been introduced in Congress. None of this proposed 
legislation, however, has been enacted into law.”). 
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into the federal budget.”72  For instance, the privacy protections that were 
put in the House bill were not included in the Senate bill.73  After years of 
attempted legislation, this bill, which was modeled after the CISA bill that 
was passed in the Senate,74 passed with much the same criticism and 
widespread opposition that the original bills had prompted.75 
A.  What Does CISA Do? 
Proponents of CISA have argued that the availability of abundant 
information about “cyberincidents and cyberthreats” will allow more reliable 
data and help corporations (and the government) more accurately “calculate 
efficient levels of cybersecurity.”76  However, companies already share technical 
information when they are attacked with other companies while still complying 
with relevant privacy laws.77  Companies have, for decades, continuously 
monitored their computer systems.78  However, Federal and state law restrained 
an entity’s ability to monitor and share detailed information of an attack.  For 
instance, provisions within the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
may effect an entity’s decision to share information.79  Under the Wiretap Act, 
a company can monitor their own system and share information to protect this 
system but are not authorized to share that information with other entities or the 
government.80  The Stored Communication Act is ambiguous concerning the 
legality of sharing information with other private entities, and companies may 
avoid sharing such information to avoid litigation.81 
 
 72. Spending Package, supra note 71; BOYD, supra note 71. 
 73.  ERIC A. FISCHER, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: COMPARISON OF H.R. 
1560 (PCNA AND NCPAA) AND S. 754 (CISA), Congressional Research Service (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44069.pdf; Andy Greenberg & Yael Grauer, CISA Security Bill 
Passes Senate with Privacy Flaws Unfixed, WIRED (Oct. 27 2015), http://www.wired.com/ 
2015/10/cisa-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-passes-senate-vote-with-privacy-flaws/; 
Oppose Omnibus, supra note 8 (“the House bill limited the used of cyber threat information to 
cybersecurity purposes the new bill allows the government to use the information shared with it by 
the private sector for numerous purposes unrelated to cybersecurity.”). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 279. 
 77.  Oppose Omnibus, supra note 8. 
 78.  Cordero A. Delgadillo, What’s New With the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act?, 
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0705fae8-d5e9-42a8 
-9a17-e2b536e1cf81. 
 79.  NOLAN, supra note 2, at 16. 
 80.  Id. at 18. 
 81.  Id. at 20. 
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Additionally, antitrust laws may also affect a company’s decision to share 
information.  This is notwithstanding the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) official statements explaining that 
information sharing of this nature falls under the rule of reason, and that its 
positive effects will weigh in favor of its legality.82  The agencies clarified that 
this does not mean it is definitively legal and antitrust suits may still be 
possible.83  Companies may also fear the possible threat of tort litigation if they 
disclose information publicly.  A company could be found negligent for failing 
to act upon a threat if an individual can show actual damages for the claim.  
Regardless, the fear of ligation may cause companies to withhold information 
regarding a cyber attack.84  CISA addresses both of these concerns by providing 
protection from antitrust and tort litigation. 
CISA also addresses concerns companies have about sharing 
information with the government.  For instance, information shared with the 
government could be disclosed to the public under the Freedom of 
Information Act, which could result in public access to proprietary 
information.85  Companies may also fear that once information is shared with 
the government, they would waive all intellectual property rights associated 
with that information.86  Lastly, companies fear that information shared with 
the government could prompt an investigation by government regulators or 
that this sensitive information could be used as evidence in a regulatory 
action against the company.87  Most, if not all these concerns have been 
addressed in CISA,88 though privacy concerns remain. 
B.  The Privacy Implications of CISA 
Criticism of CISA stems from industry leaders and the public alike; 
Salesforce, Reddit, Yelp, Twitter, and Apple have publicly opposed CISA.89  
 
 82.  NOLAN, supra note 2, at 26–49. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 29–31. 
 85.  Id. at 34. 
 86.  Id. at 36. 
 87.  Id. at 37–38; O’HARA, supra note 4, at 271 (“companies were often reluctant to come to the 
Federal Government and the Federal Bureau of Investigation because they do not want their trade secrets 
to be aired. They do not want their shareholders to know there are problems in the company”). 
 88.  The law has built in exceptions to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), antitrust laws, 
and intellectual property rights.  It also allows for the sharing of information notwithstanding 
already existing privacy laws.  Lastly, it provides for protections from derivative lawsuits. 
 89.  Amul Kalia, Tech Industry Trade Groups are Coming out Against CISA. We Need Individual 
Companies to do the Same, EFF (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/tech-industry-
trade-groups-are-coming-out-against-cisa-we-need-individual; KEANE, supra note 10. 
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Recently, Congressman Justin Amash (R-Mich.) introduced a bill that would 
repeal the cyber surveillance measure passed in the omnibus appropriations bills.90 
The major critiques of the bill include: (1) the bill authorizes companies 
to share “cyber threat indicators” regarding “cybersecurity threats” with the 
federal government and other businesses despite privacy and consumer 
privacy laws that otherwise protect that information, that is to say the bill 
allows companies to monitor their information system or another entity’s 
information system (with consent) for cybersecurity purposes, despite other 
laws that may prohibit monitoring;91 (2) the bill’s terms are broadly defined 
which allows companies to spy on a wide range of a user’s personal private 
data — the terms “cybersecurity purpose” and “cybersecurity threat” are too 
broadly defined — “cybersecurity purpose” can mean anything related to 
protecting an information system, computer or software, whereas 
“cybersecurity threat,” can include anything that can result in an 
“unauthorized effort to impact the availability of the information system,” 
thus, the extent of the permissible monitoring is unclear;92  (3) the bill does 
not prevent the government from searching “indicators” from private 
companies for information about a specific individual or for evidence of 
illicit activity;93 (4) the bill “expressly permits the government to use the 
information . . . to respond to, investigate, and prosecute activities unrelated 
to cybersecurity,” which has the potential to allow law enforcement to 
circumvent the warrant process;94 (5) the bill permits “broad sharing of 
personal information” and incentivizes companies to adopt “lazy” processes 
that permit the flow of personal data to the government, and companies do 
have to make efforts to identify personally identifiable information before 
sharing; however, their responsibility and the repercussions for sharing that 
information is curbed because they only have to remove information they 
 
 90.  BUSH, supra note 7. 
 91.  Id.; Charles Blanchard, Ronald Lee, & Nicole Neuman, Senate Intelligence Committee’s 
Recent Cybersecurity Bill Doesn’t Silence Privacy Advocates Concerns, Despite a Dozen 
Amendments, ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=69c1626c-dc89-4888-afba-3f9da15e62ff; Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, 
Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015); Cybersecurity Act of 2015, title I, sec. 105(a)(4) (Dec. 15, 2015). 
 92.  Lee Tien, Senate Intelligence Committee Advances Terrible Surveillance Bill in Secret 
Session, EFF (Mar. 19, 2015); BLANCHARD, supra note 91. 
 93.  Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113 (2015), Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2105, 129 Stat. 2242 (2016); BUSH, supra note 7. 
 94.  Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Cybersecurity Act of 2105, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 
129 Stat. 2242 (2016). Accord id. (“Including threats of serious bodily harm or economic harm, 
computer fraud, trade secrets violations, and several other criminal violations that have nothing to 
do with cyber attacks.”). 
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know at the time of sharing to be personal identifiable information;95 (6) the 
bill establishes that companies will primarily share information with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), while it “requires DHS to 
establish processes to share the information it receives with other federal 
agencies,” including intelligence agencies like the NSA, therefore, it is not 
transparent as to what the information is being used for; thereby, raising 
democratic legitimacy issues;96 and (7) “unlike previous versions of cyber 
legislation, this bill includes no exemption to the liability waiver for gross 
negligence or willful misconduct,” meaning companies may “overshare their 
user’s personal, private information with complete immunity.”97 
Additionally, some have argued that it is impossible to prove that 
sharing data could prevent a cyberattack.98  Therefore, if we are to look past 
the glaring disregard for individual civil liberties, we must look to the impact 
this legislation will have on preventing the theft of intellectual property 
through cyber economic espionage.  Many have noted, including the 
President of the U.S., that information sharing alone is not enough.99 
But is it even necessary to have legislation that asks companies to share 
this information?  While the technical details are beyond the scope of this 
article, most commentators across disciplines agree that this bill, in and of 
itself, does not provide the necessary tools to combat this ever-increasing 
 
 95.  Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Cybersecurity Act of 2105, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 
129 Stat. 2242 (2016); NOLAN, supra note 2, at 45, (“Cybersecurity purpose,” is a term of art that 
broadly encompasses nearly any effort that is aimed at protecting a system or network from a range 
of different cyberattacks). 
 96.  KEANE, supra note 10 (“Senator Ron Wyden, from Oregon, called the bill ‘badly flawed’ 
filled with ‘unacceptable surveillance provisions’ that were in need of more rigorous debate. It 
contains substantially fewer oversight and reporting provisions than the Senate version did, he said, 
adding that bodies like the CIA will be less accountable for their actions and have few rules that 
compel them to take part in investigations into the use of data.”). 
  97.  Oppose Omnibus, supra note 8. 
 98.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 282–319 (“corporations [can’t] afford to rely solely on law 
enforcement efforts to track down and bring perpetrators to justice, as law enforcement is 
‘overwhelmed’ by the problem, and hindered by a host of jurisdictional and other issues); see also, 
Mark Jaycox, Congress Should Say no to Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bills, EFF (Jan. 8, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/congress-should-say-no-cybersecurity-information-sharing-
bills (“many security breaches are due to uneducated employees downloading malware.”)  Accord, 
Matthew Goldstein, Nicole Perlroth, and Michael Corkery, Neglected Server Provided Entry for 
JP Morgan Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2014/12/22/entry-
point-of-jpmorgan-data-breach-is-identified/?_r=0 (“the computer breach at JPMorgan Chase this 
summer — the largest intrusion of an American bank to date — might have been thwarted if the 
bank had installed a simple security fix to an overlooked server in its vast network”). 
 99.  The president has said that companies need to fill in the security gag by ensuring that they 
are protecting their consumers with at least basic protections, like a good password.  Barack Obama, 
Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650. 
CYBER ECON ESPIONAGE - FINAL_TOMLASTLOOK (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2016  2:44 PM 
104 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 
 
 
problem.  CISA essentially allows for better coordination against cyber 
threats, but does not provide the tools necessary to defend against those 
threats,100 and will only “marginally help secure cyberspace.”101 
IV.  Other Options the U.S. Has to Combat  
Cyber Economic Espionage 
To provide at least a temporary solution or relief to the threat of cyber-
economic espionage, the U.S. government should look to other options that 
may better help secure U.S. corporate entities intellectual property.  Leading 
scholars have discussed three strategies: (1) using international law, (2) 
liability for private entities failing to meet basic security standards, and (3) 
allowing private entities with legislative guidance to engage in active self-
defense. Each of these options poses a lesser privacy risk, as described below. 
A.  Using International Law to Create Global Norms 
Many scholars have argued that domestic policy needs to be combined 
with diplomacy, whereby; international agreements are created to discourage 
cyber economic espionage.102  In the past, the U.S. has attempted to enter into 
talks with China but the talks have failed to produce any results.103 
However, existing principles of international law, such as state 
sovereignty and non-intervention laws, can evolve to address the issue of 
cyber economic espionage by implementing “norms” against cyber 
economic espionage, which can be established within already existing 
intergovernmental organizations.104  These norms or practices can allow 
members of the organizations to assert claims of cyber economic 
 
 100.  KALIA, supra note 89 (“CISA is fundamentally flawed in its approach to cybersecurity. 
Its information sharing regime wouldn’t even fix the most recent public breaches, since it doesn’t 
address basic problems, like unencrypted files, poor computer architecture, un-updated servers, and 
employees (or contractors) clicking malware links”). 
 101.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1470. 
 102.  O’HARA, supra note 4, at 244; LOTRIONTE, supra note 15, at 471–72; Jyh-An Lee, The 
Red Storm in Uncharted Waters: China and International Cyber Security, 82 UMKC L. REV. 951, 
963 (2014); Lawrence L. Muir, Jr., Combatting Cyber-Attacks Through National Interest 
Diplomacy: A Trilateral Treaty with Teeth, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE, 73; LEWIS, supra 
note 30, at 189; see also TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 264 (“Tom Donilon, National Security 
Advisor to the President, delivered a speech to the Asia Society unequivocally setting forth the 
expectations of the U.S. with respect to China’s role in cyber espionage.  He said that building a 
constructive relationship with China is one of the pillars of the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and he identified cybersecurity as a ‘growing challenge to [the U.S.-China] economic relationship’”). 
 103.  MUIR, supra note 102, at 83. 
 104.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1194. 
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espionage.105  This, in turn, would provide protection for users’ privacy 
rights, and cause a foreign nation to be more cautious before engaging in 
state sponsored cyber economic espionage.  However, for this model to 
work, a state would have to ensure that their cyberinfrastructure is not used 
for acts that “unlawfully affect other states,” thus state responsibility is 
necessary to have cyber economic espionage covered within the bounds of 
international law.106  This could seemingly work if a private entity were able 
to determine whether a foreign government was involved in the cyberattack, 
which they could do without providing the government with significant 
amounts of personally identifiable user information. 
According to some scholars, one approach to regulate cyber economic 
espionage is through the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).107  The WTO 
already provides a framework that governs fair trade and competition; it has 
the authority to “ensure compliance” among member states.108  The WTO 
protects intellectual and industrial property rights between member states 
through its treaties.109  It is notable that China, who poses the most prominent 
threat in the area of cyber economic espionage, is a member of the WTO.110  
The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) provides for intellectual property rules and establishes 
levels of “protection that each government has to give the intellectual property 
of fellow WTO members, [thereby] bring[ing] protection of intellectual property 
under common international rule.”111 
The WTO requires that member states “protect innovative economic 
activity that is not necessarily developed or owned by the state itself, but 
rather by private economic actors.”112  The WTO also requires member states 
to protect other states’ intellectual property, by not impeding on those 
rights.113  Skinner argues that these rules may be interpreted to indicate that 
through TRIPS economic cyber espionage is prohibited.114  While TRIPS 
does not directly address economic espionage, international law “fills the 
gaps left by treaties, unless there is a conflict between the provisions or an 
 
 105.  Id. at 1191. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  O’HARA, supra note 4; SKINNER, supra note 21 at 1194. 
 108.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1165. 
 109.  Id. at 1195. 
 110.  Peter K. Yu, Trade Secret Hacking, Online Data Breaches, and China’s Cyberthreats, 
CARDOZO L. REV. 130, 134 (2015). 
 111.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1195. 
 112.  Id. at 1196. 
 113.  Id. at 1195. 
 114.  SKINNER, supra note 21, at 1197–98. 
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express exclusion of the customary principle.”115  Thus, because the WTO is 
designed to protect intellectual property it is “compatible with and reinforces 
the norms of economic sovereignty and noneconomic intervention, as well 
as the principle that states should be held responsible for the unlawful 
economic acts that they sponsor.”116 
Furthermore, the U.S., on its own, has failed to negotiate a treaty with 
China in a series of bilateral talks.117  The WTO may be the appropriate 
authority to hold China responsible because China’s ascension as a 
superpower depends on its reputation in the international community and part 
of maintaining a positive reputation is being a part of the “world economic 
community.”118  Thus, China needs the WTO’s support.119  Additionally, if 
some international agreement is not reached to propel China to circumscribe its 
use of economic espionage its relations with U.S. will continue to diminish.120  
This could have significant effects on the Chinese economy,121 giving China 
even more incentive to agree to an international treaty. 
One area of concern is that cyber attacks may be wrongfully attributed 
to China, which can cast doubt on whether international law can effectively 
enforce a treaty.  Thus, some have argued that it may be imperative to 
“include[e] an enforcement system that features an elite professional staff, 
cutting-edge technology, and a robust international network.”122  Others have 
argued that cyber economic espionage is too new to develop customary 
international law.123  However, the evolution of international law can be fueled 
by the needs of those affected by the activity.124  Cyber economic espionage has 
the capacity to destabilize economies.125  Therefore, an international treaty 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 1204. 
 117.  YU, supra note 110, at 150. 
 118.  Id. at 1205. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  MUIR, supra note 102, at 91. 
 122.  LEE, supra note 102, at 965. 
 123.  James E. McGhee, Cyber Redux: The Schmitt Analysis, Tallinn Manual and US Cyber 
Policy, 2 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 64, 66 (2013), “the length of time to develop customary 
international law can vary greatly, but generally takes a significant number of years.  The customary 
law of war has developed over thousands of years, but the practice of limiting conflict evolved 
primarily in the last 150 years.” 
 124.  SKINNER, supra note 21. 
 125.  LEWIS, supra note 30, at 1179. 
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should play a role in combating the issue of cyber economic espionage, and the 
WTO may be the most effective forum to regulate it. 
B.  Companies Should Be Liable for Failing to Meet Regulatory 
 Standards  
Domestic policy is still a key component in tackling cyber economic 
espionage.  However, bills like CISA may not be the best approach.  One 
reform to domestic policy could be to hold companies liable for the failure 
to meet security standards, since “the national security implications of an 
insecure cyber network are just as significant, and in some ways more 
alarming, than the economic implications . . . insecure networks and 
compromised technology may threaten the U.S.’s ability to protect itself 
against its enemies.”126 
One substantial argument in favor of information sharing between private 
entities and the government was the theory that companies were not investing in 
cybersecurity and the collective mass of information would allow companies to 
easily fix their infrastructure.  The reasoning given is that executives do not want 
to invest without a “clear understanding of the return on investment.”127 Reliable 
return on investment data would depend on “the frequency of cyber incidents, the 
costs of cyber incidents, and the effectiveness of mitigation methods.”128  This 
information, as some argue, could only be obtained through information sharing 
and offering protection to private entities.129 
To counter this argument, it can be contended that without any threat of 
liability, information sharing will not incentivize private entities to invest in 
cyber security.  Most corporations, due to recent public attacks, understand 
the threat of being targeted.130  Furthermore, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has been active in creating a 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.131  Also, as 
long as the DOJ and FTC maintain that the rule of reason should apply to 
information sharing relating to cyber economic espionage, then the issues 
 
 126.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1480. 
 127.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 307–08. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id., “corporations may be reluctant to report cybersecurity breaches, for fear of 
repercussions in terms of compromised competitiveness, regulatory risk, consumer response, cost 
and/or reputation.” 
 130.  Companies such as Shadowcrew, Heartland Payment Systems, Target, and Anthem. 
 131.  NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cyberse 
curity-framework-021214-final.pdf. 
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relating to the lack of understanding on their return on investment would not 
apply. 
Additionally, law suits would allow shareholders of public corporations 
to be “more aware of the threat of economic espionage and to apply pressure 
upon corporations to ensure that there are adequate internal safeguards for 
detecting espionage.”132  Recent litigation has shown that the FTC is willing 
to bring suits against companies for failure to maintain a set of standards that 
protect customer information.133  In Federal Trade Commission v. 
Wyndham,134 the FTC alleged that Wyndham had flawed security practices 
(including failure to erect firewalls, use appropriate passwords, or configure 
software to keep credit card information secure), and “FTC officials called 
the alleged security flaws ‘obvious.’”135  When a private entity has or should 
have the knowledge of a substantial economic espionage taking place, the 
FTC should be able to hold these companies liable for failure to secure their 
customers’ information.  Thus, bills like CISA should allow companies to be 
held liable for failure to meet cybersecurity standards. 
 
C.  Private Entities Should Be Allowed to Engage in Active Defenses or 
Hack Backs 
Another approach to mitigate the threat of cyber economic espionage is 
a policy enabling private entities to engage in an active defense or a 
counteroffensive hack back.136  This approach would allow a private entity 
to counterstrike the responsible party and refrain from handing over loads of 
data to the government.  Teplinsky, among other scholars, argue that the use 
of passive defensive approaches by private entities is not enough because 
“determined adversaries will find a way to successfully breach even the most 
sophisticated and heavily fortified organizations, as demonstrated by the 
 
 132.  LEWIS, supra note 30, at 220. 
 133.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 303. 
 134.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1465–1486, a “hack-back is a method of cybersecurity that 
involves some level of retaliation, or ‘counterstrike,’ against the hacker . . . ” counterstriking can 
range from things as simple as turning over the supposed hacker to law enforcement, to damaging 
the system to prevent it from perpetrating future attacks.”  See also TEPLINSKY, supra note 1; Jorge 
L. Contreras, Laura DeNardis, & Melanie Teplinksy, Mapping Todays Cybersecurity Landscape, 
62 AM. U. L. REV. 113 (June 2013); Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett, & Anand Shah, Adequate 
Attribution: A Framework for Developing A National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active 
Defense, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2013); BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1483. 
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successful attacks on DoD, RSA, Lockheed Martin, and Google.”137  
However because the law limits the methods private entities may use as self-
defense,138 most secure their networks using only passive defense 
mechanisms.139  Passive defense includes: “(1) controlling system access; (2) 
limiting data access; (3) security administration; and (4) secure system 
design.”140  Accordingly, in order for passive measures to ensure a network is 
secure it must work 100 percent of the time, if it does not, then hackers can keep 
making attempts to breach that network until they succeed. 
Active defense, or a “hack back” can usually entail “(1) detecting the 
intrusion; (2) tracing the intruder; and (3) some form of counterstrike.”141  An 
example of a company engaging in an active defense occurred when Google, 
Inc.’s network had been infiltrated, and it was able to trace the servers to two 
Chinese educational institutions.142  Google initiated a counteroffensive and 
hacked the source back, which allowed them to discover the possibility of the 
Chinese government’s involvement in the attack.143 
An important issue that relates to this approach is the attribution issue, 
whereby “attackers are traced using some form of traceroute technology.”144  
Correctly tracing the source of a hack can happen, at best, 80 percent of the 
time.145  It becomes increasingly harder when hackers spoof their Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address or use a third-party command and control system.146 
Such attribution problems are a cause for concern from a legal perspective, 
since a company may be held liable if it hacks an innocent bystander.  
Another concern is that private entities may respond “excessively or 
 
 137.  TEPLINSKY, supra note 1, at 318. 
 138.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1486, “section (a)(2) of the CFAA — the ban on 
unauthorized access for the purpose of obtaining information — should be amended to grant victims 
of cyberattacks criminal and civil immunity for the limited purpose of investigating their attackers.  
In practice, this would mean that network security professionals, businesses, or even private 
individuals who are technologically competent, would be able to use necessary means to: (1) access 
the attacking computer; and (2) gather information about the attack, its perpetrator, its origin, and 
its purpose — nothing more.” 
 139.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1483. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1485. 
 142.  Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors 
As Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
275, 276–77 (2013). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1485. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id.; see also MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 142, at 322, “when hackers are utilizing a large 
number of zombie or bot computers to carry out their hacks, some of which might be utilized by 
particularly vulnerable targets, such as hospitals.” 
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disproportionately.”147  For these reasons, it is important that the state 
develop law and policies that will guide private entities in how to engage in 
a counter offensive.148 
Despite these concerns, it is still important that companies have the 
option to engage in a counter offensive.  For one, private entities “own the 
vast majority of [computer intelligence] in the U.S. and for that reason they 
are at a better position to identify attackers and “raise the cost of engaging in 
[cyber economic espionage].”149  Further, some have argued that hack backs 
may be the best approach because government investigations take too much 
time, whereas an active defense is more rapid and could “significantly drive 
up the costs that hackers incur, deterring future conduct.”150  Additionally, if 
it is possible to accurately target the source of the hack, the “disruption 
caused by the hackback can raise the cost of hacking in the first place[;]”151 
it can also make hackers less effective by giving private entities the ability 
to be more knowledgeable on who is conducting the hack, thereby, 
conceivably allowing them to create effective barriers to entry — 
“potentially causing some hackers to exit the game due to ineffectiveness.”152  
Therefore, the government should provide private entities the ability to engage 
in active defenses with some legislative guidance. 
V.  Conclusion 
The essential difference between traditional espionage versus cyber 
economic espionage, is that cyber economic espionage has the ability to ruin 
a nation’s economy and severely impact the global economy.  This difference 
exposes the need for discernible political action. 
The U.S. has recently attempted through various domestic policies to 
combat cyber economic espionage.  The main strategy the U.S. has 
emphasized is information sharing between the private sector and the 
government as well as information sharing between private entities.  The key 
 
 147.  MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 142, at 322. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  CONTRERAS, supra note 136, at 1116. 
 150.  MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 142, at 293. But cf. BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1486 (stating 
that the attribution problem could create potential problems, for instance, where an innocent party 
is hackbacked (an attacker can use a third party’s computer), the current state of technology for 
identifying attackers may not be sufficient to permit counter-offensive strategies.). 
 151.  Id. at 321–322; see also BRUNER, supra note 12 (stating that hack backs increase the cost 
of hacking.). 
 152.  BRUNER, supra note 12, at 1486. 
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legislation that was just secretly passed to promote information sharing was 
CISA.  However, the U.S.’s domestic policy has caused considerably more 
harm than it has prevented cyber economic espionage.  The overly broad 
protections the bill gives private entities effectively allows for an 
unregulated free-for-all of information sharing between the government and 
these entities.  This has caused concern from many privacy advocates and it 
is the reason the bill has been dubbed the Second Patriot Act.  Therefore, the 
law must evolve and move away from the notion that cyber economic 
espionage can only be combated through information sharing. 
This note proposes three other methods that could be more effective in 
combatting cyber economic espionage, including: (1) a push for policy 
change in international law; (2) holding companies accountable for failure to 
meet certain regulatory standards; and (3) creating a policy framework that 
would give private entities the option to engage in active self defense.  These 
outlined approaches do not represent an all-encompassing regulatory 
framework capable of definitively combating cyber economic espionage.  
However, the U.S. must shift away from the notion that information sharing 
is the key strategy in fighting cyber economic espionage.  As those 
legislative policies stand, their effectiveness is substantially outweighed by 
their lack of protection for individual privacy rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
